Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
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Publication:4740292
DOI10.2307/2296962zbMath0504.90003OpenAlexW1974895756MaRDI QIDQ4740292
Kim C. Border, James S. Jordan
Publication date: 1983
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-161613179
manipulabilitydictatorshipnon-manipulable direct revelation social choice functionsone- dimensional mechanismsseparable star-shaped preferenceuncompromising choice functionsweak unanimity
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