Sincere voting in models of legislative elections

DOI10.1007/BF00446986MaRDI QIDQ911969zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Austen-Smith

Publication date 1989

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00446986

zbMATH Keywords

legislative electionssincere votingelectoral competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
• Sincere voting in large elections
• Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially
• Strategic voting and nomination
• A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting

Cites work

• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters

Cited in

(5)

• Credible debate equilibria
• Electoral platforms, implemented policies, and abstention
• Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
• Sincere voting in large elections
• Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

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