Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0639-XMaRDI QIDQ2452122zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tim Groseclose, Jeffrey Milyo

Publication date 30 May 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0639-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Sincere voting in models of legislative elections
• Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting
• A lemma in open sequential voting by veto

Cites work

• Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

Cited in

(8)

• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
• Black and Farquharson on order-of-voting effects: An extension
• When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
• Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?
• Sincere voting in models of legislative elections
• Sequential legislative lobbying
• Sequential vote buying
• Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

This page was built for publication: Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2452122)