A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0464-7zbMath1232.91186OpenAlexW2133134169MaRDI QIDQ622566

Daniel J. Seidmann

Publication date: 3 February 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2009-06.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

Voting in the limelight ⋮ A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees ⋮ Ideology and endogenous constitutions ⋮ Committee design with endogenous participation ⋮ Committees, sequential voting and transparency ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees ⋮ Committees with leaks

Cites Work

• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially
• Deliberation and Voting Rules

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