Credible debate equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF01832923MaRDI QIDQ1823826zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David Austen-Smith

Publication date 1990

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumincomplete informationpolitical economicstransmission of informationcredibility in debateendogenous agenda setting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Recommendations

• Deliberative acceptability of arguments
• Argumentation in multi-issue debates
• Efficient Probabilistically Checkable Debates
• Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict*
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Empirical evaluation of strategies for multiparty argumentative debates
• Equity and Credibility
• Quantitative argumentation debates with votes for opinion polling

Cites work

• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Sincere voting in models of legislative elections
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game

Cited in

(12)

• Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
• The complexity of debate checking
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Modelling the role of information in elections
• When do simple policies win?
• State of the debate contingent arguments
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
• A conversational war of attrition
• Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
• Argumentation in multi-issue debates
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• Quantitative argumentation debates with votes for opinion polling

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