Sequential Equilibria
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Dynamic psychological games
- On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
- Mutually acceptable courses of action
- Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Extending the alternating-offers protocol in the presence of competition: Models and theoretical analysis
- A constructive approach to sequential Nash equilibria
- The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
- Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Market equilibrium in a multistage commodity network
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- The chain-store paradox revisited
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists
- A noncooperative solution to a two-person bargaining game
- Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
- Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
- A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
- Local perfection
- Common knowledge with probability 1
- Anonymous sequential games
- Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem
- On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval
- Perfect equilibrium points and lexicographic domination
- Strategic irrationality in extensive games
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria
- Refinements of Nash equilibrium: A critique
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory
- A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- Lexicographic domination in extensive games
- Approximation of contractible valued correspondences by functions
- Multitrade bargaining
- Economic implications of imperfect quality certification
- The strength of a little perfection
- Equilibrium refinement in psychological games
- Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory
- Equilibrium exit in stochastically declining industries
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- A note on equalization in extensive form games
- Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing
- Viscous population equilibria
- Backward induction and beliefs about oneself
- Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
- Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
- On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
- The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria
- State-independent subjective expected lexicographic utility
- Validated equilibrium and sequential spatial competition games
- Player importance and forward induction
- Rational beliefs in extensive games
- Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
- The space of conditional systems is a ball
- Limit consistent solutions in noncooperative games
- Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
- Delegation and the regulation of risk
- Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation
- Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall
- Efficiency in sequential partnerships
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- On non-Nash equilibria
- A duopoly model of pricing for inventory liquidation
- The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
- Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information
- Sequential equilibria and stable sets of beliefs
- Strategic behavior in dynamic auctions
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?
- Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games
- Sequential regularity in smooth production economies
- Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall
- Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
- Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
- Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
- Rationality and bounded rationality
- Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games
- Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
- Modeling agents as qualitative decision makers
- Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning.
- Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Weak isomorphism of extensive games.
- Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
- Privately observed time horizons in repeated games
- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- Plausible equilibria and backward payoff-keeping behavior
- Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem
- Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation
- Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
- Persuasion and receiver's news
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