Sequential Equilibria
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- The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
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- An epistemic characterization of MACA
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- On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games
- Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Sequentially stable outcomes
- Contractual chains
- Ex ante versus interim rationality and the existence of bubbles
- Forward induction equilibrium
- Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
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- Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games
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- A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types
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- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
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- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
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- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
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- Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
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