Player importance and forward induction

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90073-8MaRDI QIDQ1198130zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Amin H. Amershi, Asha Sadanand, Venkatraman Sadanand

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90073-8

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selection problemforward inductionNash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• On Forward Induction
• Forward induction equilibrium
• Strong forward induction
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302001 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Sequential Equilibria

Cited in

(4)

• Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
• Ideal reactive equilibrium
• Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
• Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk

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