Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.03.006MaRDI QIDQ2486154zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steffen Huck, W. Müller

Publication date 5 August 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/689210/Burning.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Battle-of-the-sexes gameBurning moneyCoordinationExperimentsFirst-mover advantageForward inductionPhysical timing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
• A laboratory investigation of multiperson rationality and presentation effects
• Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
• Forward induction in coordination games
• Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679849 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
• Limitations of dominance and forward induction:
• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form
• Order of play, forward induction, and presentation effects in two-person games
• Player importance and forward induction
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games
• Theory of games and economic behavior.
• Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link coordination games
• When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis

Cited in

(10)

• On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money
• Ideal reactive equilibrium
• When curiosity kills the profits: an experimental examination
• Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
• Coordination via delay: theory and experiment
• What drives people's choices in turn-taking games, if not game-theoretic rationality?
• How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective
• Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
• Resource Burning for Permissionless Systems (Invited Paper)
• Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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