Stable equilibria and forward induction
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Publication:1122514
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90038-0zbMath0675.90099OpenAlexW3022704649MaRDI QIDQ1122514
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/stable-equilibria-and-forward-induction(e4c0a7ec-55b2-474c-8dae-19e732ae94a9).html
Related Items (52)
Delegation Using Forward Induction ⋮ The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint ⋮ Inefficient stage Nash is not stable ⋮ On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria ⋮ The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation ⋮ A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games ⋮ A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES ⋮ On the possibility of stable renegotiation ⋮ Limitations of dominance and forward induction: ⋮ Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty ⋮ Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment ⋮ Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games ⋮ On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money ⋮ Communication, risk, and efficiency in games ⋮ Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Admissibility and common belief. ⋮ Coordination via delay: theory and experiment ⋮ Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence ⋮ Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ The impossibility of stable renegotiation ⋮ Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games ⋮ How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective ⋮ Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example ⋮ Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior ⋮ Self enforceable paths in extensive form games ⋮ Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games ⋮ A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy. ⋮ Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games ⋮ Receiver's dilemma ⋮ Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing ⋮ Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria ⋮ Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice ⋮ Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach ⋮ Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction ⋮ MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY ⋮ Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance ⋮ Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study ⋮ Network architecture, salience and coordination ⋮ Forward induction in coordination games ⋮ Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility ⋮ Cheap talk and burned money ⋮ Resisting persuasion ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction ⋮ On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability ⋮ Strong forward induction ⋮ Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm ⋮ Voluntary versus enforced team effort ⋮ Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
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