Stable equilibria and forward induction

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90038-0zbMath0675.90099MaRDI QIDQ1122514

Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/stable-equilibria-and-forward-induction(e4c0a7ec-55b2-474c-8dae-19e732ae94a9).html

zbMATH Keywords

stable equilibria; forward induction; self-enforcingness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

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