The impossibility of stable renegotiation

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(88)90192-9zbMath1328.91029OpenAlexW2135849587WikidataQ126339410 ScholiaQ126339410MaRDI QIDQ900096

Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/efabc2cc-bf8f-41b1-ba50-cd432ed69081

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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On the possibility of stable renegotiation

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Finitely Repeated Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria