Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90111-7zbMath0688.90065OpenAlexW2239493694MaRDI QIDQ1264101

Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/renegotiationproof-equilibria-in-repeated-prisoners-dilemma(9bd8c72f-cc2f-413c-b429-7bdfde6d6218).html

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriaPrisoner's Dilemmarenegotiation-proof equilibriumFolk Theoremrepeated one-shot Nash outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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