Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners' dilemma games

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2015.01.040zbMath1338.91021OpenAlexW1980785101MaRDI QIDQ299619

Takehiro Inohara, Yuankan Huang

Publication date: 22 June 2016

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2015.01.040

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumcomplete graphgroup-separationtrigger strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Impact of neighborhood separation on the spatial reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Stable networks
• Active linking in evolutionary games
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• HETEROGENEOUS LINK WEIGHT PROMOTES THE COOPERATION IN SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA
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