Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.006zbMath1279.91024MaRDI QIDQ665097

Akira Okada, Toshimasa Maruta

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency; repeated games; prisoner's dilemma; group formation; renegotiation; noncooperative coalitional bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners' dilemma games

Cites Work

• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
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• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements