Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.006MaRDI QIDQ665097zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toshimasa Maruta, Akira Okada

Publication date 5 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyprisoner's dilemmarepeated gamesgroup formationrenegotiationnoncooperative coalitional bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners' dilemma games
• COALITION BARGAINING IN REPEATED GAMES
• Formation and long‐run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Contracting with externalities and outside options
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Starting small and renegotiation
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(4)

• Campaigning internally or externally
• Intergroup prisoner's dilemma with intragroup power dynamics
• Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners' dilemma games
• Formation and long‐run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation

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