Impact of neighborhood separation on the spatial reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game

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Publication:400827

DOI10.1016/j.chaos.2013.03.002zbMath1294.91027OpenAlexW2007203202MaRDI QIDQ400827

Qin Miao, Juanjuan Zhang, Cheng-yi Xia

Publication date: 26 August 2014

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2013.03.002



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