A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
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Publication:1393354
DOI10.1007/BF01737566zbMath0276.90069OpenAlexW3123237673MaRDI QIDQ1393354
Publication date: 1973
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01737566
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