Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90029-EMaRDI QIDQ1194053zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Geir B. Asheim

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90029-E

zbMATH Keywords

infinite horizon gamesPareto-perfect equilibriumPareto-perfect social norm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system
• Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141836 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.

Cited in

(14)

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting
• Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments
• Bargaining power in repeated games
• Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games
• A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games
• Justifiable punishments in repeated games
• Forward-looking principle in repeated games
• The market for conservation and other hostages
• Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games
• Revision proofness
• Renegotiation perfection in infinite games

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