Revision proofness

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.03.008MaRDI QIDQ403746zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Laurence Ales, Christopher Sleet

Publication date 29 August 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesequilibrium refinementsrenegotiation-proofnessrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Dynamic games (91A25) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Recommendations

• Revision games
• Renegotiation perfection in infinite games
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games

Cites work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Individual and Collective Time-Consistency
• Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• The Existence of Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Growth with Altruism between Generations
• The recursive approach to time inconsistency
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(7)

• On nonexistence of reconsideration-proof equilibrium with state variables
• Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency
• Semi-revision
• Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1241663 (Why is no real title available?)
• Revision games
• Information aggregation under ambiguity: theory and experimental evidence

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