Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90075-6MaRDI QIDQ1124542zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph Greenberg

Publication date 1989

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90075-6

zbMATH Keywords

abstract coreabstract stable setcoalition-proof Nash equilibriumnegotiation processstrong Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
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Cites work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784577 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(11)

• The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy
• Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
• Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system
• Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
• Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
• Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets
• The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency
• Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games
• Stable coalition structures for transversal problems

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