A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy
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Publication:1338987
DOI10.1007/BF01212918zbMath0808.90024MaRDI QIDQ1338987
Jeffrey M. Lacker, John A. Weinberg
Publication date: 27 November 1994
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212918
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Cites Work
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