Financial intermediary-coalitions
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Publication:1072421
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90115-8zbMath0586.90013OpenAlexW2084894276MaRDI QIDQ1072421
John H. Boyd, Edward C. Prescott
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90115-8
Related Items (25)
Entrepreneurship, Financiership, and Selection* ⋮ Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information ⋮ A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy ⋮ The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification ⋮ Optimal multilateral contracts ⋮ Financial markets in development, and the development of financial markets ⋮ Equilibrium with mutual organizations in adverse selection economies ⋮ An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies ⋮ Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection ⋮ Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns ⋮ Transaction costs and institutions: investments in exchange ⋮ Trade through endogenous intermediaries ⋮ Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models ⋮ On income taxation and the core ⋮ The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games ⋮ Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary ⋮ Financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs ⋮ Banking competition and welfare ⋮ Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection ⋮ Matching markets with adverse selection ⋮ Mandatory disclosure tone and bank risk-taking: evidence from Europe ⋮ Intermediaries and payments instruments. ⋮ DO RISK PREMIA PROTECT AGAINST BANKING CRISES? ⋮ Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core ⋮ Financial collapse: a lesson from the great depression.
Cites Work
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
- General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
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