Financial intermediary-coalitions

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Publication:1072421

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90115-8zbMath0586.90013OpenAlexW2084894276MaRDI QIDQ1072421

John H. Boyd, Edward C. Prescott

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90115-8




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