Equilibrium with mutual organizations in adverse selection economies

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0918-3MaRDI QIDQ324337zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adam Blandin, John H. Boyd, Edward C. Prescott

Publication date 11 October 2016

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp717.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

signalinginsuranceadverse selection equilibriummutual organizationthe coretheory of value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
• An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection.
• Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3006370 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
• Financial intermediary-coalitions
• General equilibrium theory and increasing returns
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Perfect Competition and the Core
• The no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium
• VALUATION EQUILIBRIUM AND PARETO OPTIMUM

Cited in

(5)

• A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
• Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
• Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
• Partnership markets with adverse selection
• General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection

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