A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection

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Publication:4006310

DOI10.2307/2297953zbMath0751.90014OpenAlexW1971724430MaRDI QIDQ4006310

Douglas Gale

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297953




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