Refinements and incentive efficiency in Walrasian models of insurance economies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2441225
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.007zbMath1284.91329OpenAlexW3121586625MaRDI QIDQ2441225
Alessandro Citanna, Paolo Siconolfi
Publication date: 24 March 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.007
Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A theory of hyperfinite processes: The complete removal of individual uncertainty via exact LLN
- Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
- General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
- A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
- Incentives, Contracts, and Markets: A General Equilibrium Theory of Firms
This page was built for publication: Refinements and incentive efficiency in Walrasian models of insurance economies
