An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies
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Publication:2150436
Recommendations
- Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
- Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons
- Efficiency and adverse selection
- Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
- Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
Cites work
- A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
- A game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection
- A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Competitive markets with private information on both sides
- Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
- Financial intermediary-coalitions
- General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
- Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
- Microeconomic theory
- Monopoly and product quality
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Perfect Competition in Markets With Adverse Selection
- Valuation equilibrium with clubs
Cited in
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