An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies
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Publication:2150436
DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01329-2zbMATH Open1494.91063OpenAlexW3132225240MaRDI QIDQ2150436FDOQ2150436
Publication date: 27 June 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01329-2
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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- Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
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