Efficiency and adverse selection

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90038-LMaRDI QIDQ1173869zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Payne Bigelow

Publication date 25 June 1992

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90038-l

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionasymmetric informationconstrained efficiencyefficient allocationslemons model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection

Cites work

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• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs
• Competitive signalling
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Informational Equilibrium
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Optimism and experts against adverse selection in a competitive economy
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

Cited in

(12)

• An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
• Adverse Selection and Security Design
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
• Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection
• Early selection and moral hazard
• General equilibrium in markets for lemons
• Analysis of a dynamic adverse selection model with asymptotic efficiency
• Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion
• Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information

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