Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
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(84)- Mechanism design with collusive supervision
- Outsourcing of innovation
- Optimum/near-optimum incentive policies for stochastic decision problems involving parametric uncertainty
- Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information
- Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Efficiency and adverse selection
- The generalized Nash bargaining solution and incentive compatible mechanisms
- Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
- Starting small and renegotiation
- A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
- Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets
- The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation
- On the value of persuasion by experts
- (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
- Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
- Two-person bargaining with verifiable information
- Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller
- Informed principal and countervailing incentives
- Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment
- On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments
- Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
- Sustainability of intertwined supply networks: a game-theoretic approach
- The platform design problem
- A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information
- A Markovian Stackelberg game approach for computing an optimal dynamic mechanism
- Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator
- Experimental design to persuade
- Understanding the dynamics of sustainable social-ecological systems: human behavior, institutions, and regulatory feedback networks
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
- Bidder collusion
- Information transmission in coalitional voting games
- Endogenizing the provision of money: costs of commodity and fiat monies in relation to the value of trade
- Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
- Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
- Bribing in second-price auctions
- Informed principal with correlation
- Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Contests with dominant strategies
- A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types
- Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
- Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
- Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Bargaining over incentive contracts
- Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
- Optimal incentive strategy in a continuous time inverse Stackelberg game
- A comparative analysis of sustainable exploitation of renewable resources for different information structures
- Evaluating strategic structures in multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning
- Selling with evidence
- A note on pre-play communication
- The strategically ignorant principal
- Interim third-party selection in bargaining
- Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
- Computing a mechanism for a Bayesian and partially observable Markov approach
- Mechanism design with informational punishment
- A comparative analysis of sustainable exploitation of renewable resources for different information structures
- Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
- Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Information exchange through secret vertical contracts
- Meaning in communication games
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
- Data provision to an informed seller
- Starting small and commitment
- Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information
- Cooperative games with incomplete information
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
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