Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.018zbMATH Open1330.91043OpenAlexW2127001565MaRDI QIDQ894045FDOQ894045

Simone Galperti

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.018

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zbMATH Keywords

signalcommon agencyinformed principaldelegation principleinscrutability principlemenu

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Definable and contractible contracts
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
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• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
• Common Agency
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Multi-contracting mechanism design
• Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing.
• Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
• Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
• Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection

Cited In (3)

• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information
• Information exchange through secret vertical contracts

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