Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.018MaRDI QIDQ894045zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Simone Galperti

Publication date 23 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.018

zbMATH Keywords

signalcommon agencyinformed principaldelegation principleinscrutability principlemenu

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Recommendations

• On the use of menus in sequential common agency
• Competition between asymmetrically informed principals
• Common Agency
• Dynamic common agency.
• Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1232374 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3277161 (Why is no real title available?)
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Common Agency
• Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
• Definable and contractible contracts
• Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Multi-contracting mechanism design
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing.

Cited in

(11)

• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Information exchange through secret vertical contracts
• On the use of menus in sequential common agency
• Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium
• Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters
• Games Played Through Agents
• Common agency with caring agents
• Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information
• On take it or leave it offers in common agency
• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences

This page was built for publication: Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q894045)