Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on common agency models of moral hazard
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Common Agency
- Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- Erratum to ``Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency: [Journal of economic theory 111 (2003) 88--109]
- Games Played Through Agents
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Multi-contracting mechanism design
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
Cited in
(6)- On take it or leave it offers in common agency
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- From private to public common agency.
- Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
- On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
- The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections
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