Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:931785
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.11.001zbMATH Open1141.91350OpenAlexW2075838120MaRDI QIDQ931785FDOQ931785
Authors: Andrea Attar, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Gwenaël Piaser, Nicolás Porteiro 
Publication date: 26 June 2008
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.11.001
Recommendations
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- Common agency with adverse selection: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of separation equilibrium
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
- From private to public common agency.
Cites Work
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Common Agency
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Multi-contracting mechanism design
- Games Played Through Agents
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- A note on common agency models of moral hazard
- Erratum to ``Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency: [Journal of economic theory 111 (2003) 88--109]
Cited In (6)
- On take it or leave it offers in common agency
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- From private to public common agency.
- Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
- On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
- The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections
This page was built for publication: Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q931785)
