Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
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Publication:5952425
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2702zbMath0996.91029MaRDI QIDQ5952425
Didier Laussel, Michel Le Breton
Publication date: 6 November 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2702
91A80: Applications of game theory
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