Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2702zbMATH Open0996.91029OpenAlexW1480238767MaRDI QIDQ5952425FDOQ5952425

Didier Laussel, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 6 November 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2702

zbMATH Keywords

common agencytruthful equilibriaequilibrium payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

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• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
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• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
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• Common Agency
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
• Complements and substitutes in common agency

Cited In (26)

• Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem
• A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
• Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
• Profit-maximizing matchmaker
• Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters
• Selecting equilibria in common agency games
• On the accessibility of core-extensions
• Dynamic common agency.
• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
• Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• From private to public common agency.
• The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry
• Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents
• Conflicts of interest during contact investigations: a game-theoretic analysis
• Cores of combined games
• A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict: The genesis of bargaining power
• Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game
• Technical Note—Nonlinear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information
• Competitive contract design in a retail supply chain under demand uncertainty
• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
• Foreword
• The costs of conflict: a choice-theoretic, equilibrium analysis
• Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
• A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency
• Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria

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