Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
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Publication:5952425
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099359 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Common Agency
- Complements and substitutes in common agency
- Cores of convex games
- Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
- Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
Cited in
(26)- Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
- Conflicts of interest during contact investigations: a game-theoretic analysis
- A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency
- Foreword
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict: The genesis of bargaining power
- Cores of combined games
- Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters
- Dynamic common agency.
- Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
- Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- On the accessibility of core-extensions
- Competitive contract design in a retail supply chain under demand uncertainty
- From private to public common agency.
- The costs of conflict: a choice-theoretic, equilibrium analysis
- Selecting equilibria in common agency games
- Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
- Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem
- The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry
- Technical note: Nonlinear pricing competition with private capacity information
- Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents
- Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
- Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
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