Complements and substitutes in common agency

DOI10.1006/reco.1996.0022zbMath0874.90228OpenAlexW2029636325MaRDI QIDQ4345445

Michel Le Breton, Didier Laussel

Publication date: 23 July 1997

Published in: Ricerche Economiche (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/reco.1996.0022

zbMATH Keywords

rentprivate common agency games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items

Dynamic common agency. ⋮ From private to public common agency. ⋮ Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

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