From private to public common agency.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00077-2MaRDI QIDQ1406472zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Bruno Versaevel, Etienne Billette De Villemeur

Publication date 4 September 2003

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00077-2

zbMATH Keywords

Common agencyExternalitiesPrivatePublic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Common Agency
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Cites work

• Complements and substitutes in common agency
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence

Cited in

(8)

• Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
• Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents
• A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency
• Complements and substitutes in common agency
• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
• Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
• Erratum to ``Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency: [Journal of economic theory 111 (2003) 88--109]

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