Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents

DOI10.1007/S00199-003-0365-4MaRDI QIDQ1422246zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors D. Massart

Publication date 5 February 2004

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0365-4

zbMATH Keywords

Common agencyMenus of alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cited in

(6)

• Pure-strategy equilibria with non-expected utility players
• From private to public common agency.
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• When your gain is also my gain. A class of strategic models with other-regarding agents
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions

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