Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.025MaRDI QIDQ993781zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Cl. d'Aspremont, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira

Publication date 20 September 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2005-18.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common agencycompetitive toughnessoligopolistic competitiontacit collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Review text

The authors analyze oligopolistic competition in the common agent multi-principal framework; their approach is more comprehensive and more appropriate to deal with differentiated goods.

Recommendations

• Competition between asymmetrically informed principals
• Analysis of game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market under constrains on the capacity and competitiveness of agents
• Multiproduct-firm oligopoly: an aggregative games approach
• Common Agency
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

Cites work

• Common Agency
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
• Different selling strategies in Bertrand oligopoly
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 970197 (Why is no real title available?)
• Price-quantity competition with varying toughness
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

Cited in

(2)

• Oligopolistic vs. monopolistic competition: do intersectoral effects matter?
• A model of tacit collusion: Nash-2 equilibrium concept

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