Selecting equilibria in common agency games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.010zbMath1158.91426OpenAlexW2071381416MaRDI QIDQ1007323

Lars Stole, David Martimort

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16217/1/select_equilibria.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationequilibrium selectioncomplete informationcommon agencypublic goodcommon screening device

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Public goods (91B18) Economics of information (91B44)

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