Selecting equilibria in common agency games
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Publication:1007323
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.06.010zbMATH Open1158.91426OpenAlexW2071381416MaRDI QIDQ1007323FDOQ1007323
Authors: David Martimort, Lars Stole 
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16217/1/select_equilibria.pdf
Recommendations
- Dynamic common agency.
- Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
- Competition between asymmetrically informed principals
- Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
- A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
asymmetric informationpublic goodequilibrium selectioncomplete informationcommon agencycommon screening device
Cites Work
- Cores of convex games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
Cited In (14)
- Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem
- A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
- Common agency with risk-averse agent
- Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters
- Dynamic common agency.
- Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
- Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure
- Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
- Technical note: Nonlinear pricing competition with private capacity information
- Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
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