A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game

DOI10.3982/TE2266MaRDI QIDQ4612467zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors David Martimort, Aggey Semenov, Lars Stole

Publication date 31 January 2019

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2266

zbMATH Keywords

dualityequilibrium selectionaggregate gamesintrinsic common agencymechanism design for delegated decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100 (Why is no real title available?)
• A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Common Agency
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Contractible contracts in common agency problems
• Dynamic price competition in aftermarkets with network effects
• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Multi-contracting mechanism design
• Multidimensional screening.
• Optimal Delegation
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
• Selecting equilibria in common agency games
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry
• The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps
• Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
• When two-part tariffs are not enough: mixing with nonlinear pricing

Cited in

(3)

• Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
• Selecting equilibria in common agency games
• Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information

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