A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
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Publication:4612467
DOI10.3982/TE2266zbMath1419.91020OpenAlexW2897263669WikidataQ129048310 ScholiaQ129048310MaRDI QIDQ4612467
Lars Stole, Aggey Semenov, David Martimort
Publication date: 31 January 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2266
dualityequilibrium selectionaggregate gamesintrinsic common agencymechanism design for delegated decision-making
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