Optimal Delegation

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00471.xzbMath1141.91354OpenAlexW4233255451MaRDI QIDQ5438600

Niko Matouschek, Ricardo J. Alonso

Publication date: 24 January 2008

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00471.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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