Optimal Delegation
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Publication:5438600
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00471.xzbMath1141.91354MaRDI QIDQ5438600
Niko Matouschek, Ricardo J. Alonso
Publication date: 24 January 2008
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00471.x
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