Goodwill in communication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105467zbMATH Open1497.91055OpenAlexW4225265304MaRDI QIDQ2155233FDOQ2155233

João Daniel Palma Ramos, Elliot Lipnowski, Aditya Kuvalekar

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105467

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zbMATH Keywords

communicationcheap talkrepeated gamepersuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Long Cheap Talk
• Lectures on Choquet's theorem
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Delegation
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Cheap talk and burned money
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
• Repeated delegation
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• A note on cheap talk and burned money
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Dynamic communication with biased senders
• Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
• Informative Cheap Talk in Elections
• The value of mediated communication
• Relational communication

Cited In (2)

• Good manners: signaling social preferences
• Repeated communication with private lying costs

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