Goodwill in communication
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2155233
Recommendations
Cites work
- A note on cheap talk and burned money
- A two-person game of information transmission
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
- Cheap talk and burned money
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Dynamic communication with biased senders
- Dynamic sender-receiver games
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
- Informative cheap talk in elections
- Lectures on Choquet's theorem
- Long Cheap Talk
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Delegation
- Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Relational communication
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
- Repeated delegation
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- The value of mediated communication
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: Goodwill in communication
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2155233)