The value of mediated communication
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Publication:1995329
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105191zbMATH Open1458.91043OpenAlexW2732174589MaRDI QIDQ1995329FDOQ1995329
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105191
incentive compatibilityconcavificationBayesian persuasioncommunication gamesvirtual utilityoptimal mediation
Cites Work
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
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- Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
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Cited In (10)
- \textit{simple} mediation in a cheap-talk game
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Communication with endogenous deception costs
- Mediated talk: an experiment
- Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests
- Long information design
- Goodwill in communication
- Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach
- Resilient Information Aggregation
- Communication via intermediaries
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