Recommendations
Cited in
(13)- Full surplus extraction from samples
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
- An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
- Mechanism design with information acquisition
- On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
- Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Mediated contracts and mechanism design
- Mediated Confirmation
- Self-evident events and the value of linking
- Detecting profitable deviations
- Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation
- The value of privacy in cartels: an analysis of the inner workings of a bidding ring
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