Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
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Publication:2690369
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0089OpenAlexW3216891894MaRDI QIDQ2690369
Publication date: 16 March 2023
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0089
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- Mediated Partnerships
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