Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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Publication:1036596
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005zbMath1193.91021MaRDI QIDQ1036596
Publication date: 13 November 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6102
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