Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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Publication:1036596
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.02.005zbMATH Open1193.91021OpenAlexW2170596364MaRDI QIDQ1036596FDOQ1036596
Authors: Tristan Tomala 
Publication date: 13 November 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6102
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Cites Work
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Cited In (17)
- Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
- Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
- Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
- Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
- Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
- Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
- Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Imperfect monitoring in communication networks
- Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
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