Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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Publication:1036596
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
- Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- On infinite systems of linear inequalities
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
- Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
- Repeated proximity games.
- Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Sequential Equilibria
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Cited in
(19)- Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games
- Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
- Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
- On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
- Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Myopic perception in repeated games
- Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
- Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
- Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
- Imperfect monitoring in communication networks
- Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
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