Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
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Publication:2442425
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.002zbMath1284.91045OpenAlexW2080588950MaRDI QIDQ2442425
Publication date: 3 April 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.002
Related Items (2)
Cooperation in partly observable networked markets ⋮ Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy
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- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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