Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.002zbMath1284.91045OpenAlexW2080588950MaRDI QIDQ2442425

Marie Laclau

Publication date: 3 April 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.002

zbMATH Keywords

communicationnetworksrepeated gamesfolk theoremimperfect private monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Cooperation in partly observable networked markets ⋮ Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Folk theorem with communication
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Repeated proximity games.
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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