Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
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Publication:2442425
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.05.002zbMATH Open1284.91045OpenAlexW2080588950MaRDI QIDQ2442425FDOQ2442425
Publication date: 3 April 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.002
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Cites Work
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Folk theorem with communication
- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
- Repeated proximity games.
- Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
Cited In (7)
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
- Folk theorem with communication
- Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy
- Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Cooperation in partly observable networked markets
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