Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
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Publication:524971
DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0498-2zbMATH Open1388.91049OpenAlexW1526367993MaRDI QIDQ524971FDOQ524971
Juan I. Block, David K. Levine
Publication date: 27 April 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/260376
Recommendations
- Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring
- Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
- On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
- Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
Cites Work
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Definable and contractible contracts
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Program equilibrium
- A commitment folk theorem
- Promises and Partnership
- Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
- Reciprocal contracting
- Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems
- The evolution of cooperation through imitation
- Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
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