Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0498-2MaRDI QIDQ524971zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan I. Block, David K. Levine

Publication date 27 April 2017

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/260376

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremrepeated gameapproximate equilibriumself-referential game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring
• Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
• Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring

Cites work

• A commitment folk theorem
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Contractible contracts in common agency problems
• Definable and contractible contracts
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Program equilibrium
• Promises and Partnership
• Reciprocal contracting
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• The evolution of cooperation through imitation

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