Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3311755 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Distributed games
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Game theory
- On players with a bounded number of states
- On rational computability and communication complexity
- Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Cited in
(20)- Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
- A parametric, resource-bounded generalization of Löb's theorem, and a robust cooperation criterion for open-source game theory
- Game theory with translucent players
- Commitment in first-price auctions
- A commitment folk theorem
- Strong mediated equilibrium
- Perfect prediction in normal form: superrational thinking extended to non-symmetric games
- Equilibrium agenda formation
- Robust program equilibrium
- Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
- Equilibrium as compatibility of plans
- Game-theoretic models of moral and other-regarding agents (extended abstract)
- Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium
- Program equilibrium -- a program reasoning approach
- Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
- Sequential commitment games
- On the impact of player capability on congestion games
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality
- Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
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