Program equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.02.002zbMATH Open1085.91004OpenAlexW4245774394MaRDI QIDQ705874FDOQ705874

Authors: Moshe Tennenholtz 

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.002

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Game theory
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On players with a bounded number of states
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
• Distributed games
• On rational computability and communication complexity

Cited In (20)

• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
• A parametric, resource-bounded generalization of Löb's theorem, and a robust cooperation criterion for open-source game theory
• Game theory with translucent players
• Commitment in first-price auctions
• A commitment folk theorem
• Strong mediated equilibrium
• Perfect prediction in normal form: superrational thinking extended to non-symmetric games
• Equilibrium agenda formation
• Robust program equilibrium
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Equilibrium as compatibility of plans
• Game-theoretic models of moral and other-regarding agents (extended abstract)
• Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium
• Program equilibrium -- a program reasoning approach
• Sequential commitment games
• Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
• On the impact of player capability on congestion games
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality
• Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

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