Program equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.002zbMath1085.91004OpenAlexW4245774394MaRDI QIDQ705874

Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (17)

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games ⋮ Game theory with translucent players ⋮ Strong mediated equilibrium ⋮ Robust program equilibrium ⋮ Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium ⋮ Program equilibrium -- a program reasoning approach ⋮ Sequential commitment games ⋮ On the impact of player capability on congestion games ⋮ A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality ⋮ Perfect prediction in normal form: superrational thinking extended to non-symmetric games ⋮ A folk theorem for competing mechanisms ⋮ Repeated implementation and complexity considerations ⋮ Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples ⋮ Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games ⋮ A commitment folk theorem ⋮ A PARAMETRIC, RESOURCE-BOUNDED GENERALIZATION OF LÖB’S THEOREM, AND A ROBUST COOPERATION CRITERION FOR OPEN-SOURCE GAME THEORY ⋮ Commitment in first-price auctions

Cites Work

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• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• On players with a bounded number of states
• Distributed games
• Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
• On rational computability and communication complexity

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