Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:926328
DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0034-3zbMATH Open1152.91309OpenAlexW2032228730MaRDI QIDQ926328FDOQ926328
Authors: Hannu Vartiainen
Publication date: 27 May 2008
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0034-3
Recommendations
Cites Work
- A course in game theory.
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Long Cheap Talk
- Program equilibrium
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Rationality and bounded rationality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
- Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Voluntary implementation
- Repeated implementation
Cited In (1)
This page was built for publication: Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q926328)