Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

DOI10.2307/2938301zbMATH Open0731.90009OpenAlexW2025306987MaRDI QIDQ3358486FDOQ3358486

Authors:

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938301

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zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitybargainingcontractingNash equilibriumimplementationdomain restrictionsocial choice mechanismrestricted veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
• Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
• Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Implementation by mediated equilibrium
• Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
• Nash implementation of the majority rule
• Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
• Two-person ex post implementation
• Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
• Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
• Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
• An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
• Coalition formation in games of fair division
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Implementation in generalized matching problems
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• Implementation with evidence
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Optimal delay in committees
• Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
• Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
• Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• Interactive implementation
• On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
• A simple model of two-stage choice
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
• Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
• A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
• Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
• Spatial implementation
• Complexity and repeated implementation
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Voluntary implementation
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
• Nash implementation in rationing problems with single-crossing preferences
• An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
• Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
• Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
• Epsilon-Nash implementation
• A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
• Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
• Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
• A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
• Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
• Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
• Implementation of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization
• Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
• Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
• Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
• Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
• Constrained implementation
• Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
• Implementation in partial equilibrium
• Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
• Implementation theory
• One-step-ahead implementation
• Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
• Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
• Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player
• Nash implementation in pure public good economies
• The revelation approach to Nash implementation
• Implementation of voting operators
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
• Two-agent interactive implementation
• Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
• Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
• A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
• Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Behavioral strong implementation
• The endowment game when \(n = 2\)
• Nash implementation with a private good
• Implementation in generic environments
• Implementing a surplus division rule
• Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
• Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
• An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria

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