Selecting winners with partially honest jurors

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.05.005MaRDI QIDQ325030zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sonal Yadav

Publication date 17 October 2016

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

partially honest jurorswinner selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Picking the winners
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants

Cites work

• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Implementation with evidence
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Picking the winners
• Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• The scholarship assignment problem

Cited in

(8)

• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
• Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
• Picking the winners
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Evaluation and strategic manipulation
• Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
• Nash implementation of supermajority rules

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