Evaluation and strategic manipulation

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102828zbMath1519.91074MaRDI QIDQ6100481

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 22 June 2023

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evaluationmanipulabilitymechanism designimpartialityranking of candidates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
• Picking the winners
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• The scholarship assignment problem
• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• A Model of Expertise
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

This page was built for publication: Evaluation and strategic manipulation