Evaluation and strategic manipulation
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Publication:6100481
Recommendations
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways
- Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
Cites work
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- A model of expertise
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Picking the winners
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The scholarship assignment problem
Cited in
(10)- Ranking blame
- Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways
- Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
- Almost optimal manipulation of pairwise comparisons of alternatives
- Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts
- On strategy-proof direct mechanism of active expertise over strictly convex compact set
- A two-stage mechanism for ordinal peer assessment
- Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts
- Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
- Nash implementation of supermajority rules
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