Evaluation and strategic manipulation
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Publication:6100481
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102828zbMATH Open1519.91074MaRDI QIDQ6100481FDOQ6100481
Authors: Pablo Amorós 
Publication date: 22 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- A model of expertise
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Picking the winners
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
Cited In (6)
- Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts
- A two-stage mechanism for ordinal peer assessment
- Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways
- On strategy-proof direct mechanism of active expertise over strictly convex compact set
- Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
- Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
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