Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
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Publication:2681504
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.003OpenAlexW4309441390MaRDI QIDQ2681504
Philippos Louis, Matías Núñez, Dimitrios Xefteris
Publication date: 3 February 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.003
Individual preferences (91B08) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
Uses Software
Cites Work
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