Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games
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Publication:926202
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0230-yzbMath1154.91007MaRDI QIDQ926202
Publication date: 26 May 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0230-y
60J20: Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.)
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
91A22: Evolutionary games
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